1 Introduction
1.1 We have been commissioned by the Quality Assurance Agency for Higher Education (“the QAA”) to provide it with an update on the law relating to student complaints and appeals to inform the review of its Code of Practice (“the Code”) for the assurance of academic quality and standards in higher education (section 5: academic appeals and student complaints on academic matters – March 2000).
1.2 We propose in this update to highlight the key legal themes in this area, to give an overview of the legislative developments and to include certain judicial decisions which highlight key points. We would be pleased to provide further details as is felt appropriate but we have sought to capture the main issues in general terms.
1.3 We have not concentrated on non-academic disciplinary matters in this update as this is an area which is stated in the current Code to fall outwith its provenance. We attach at Appendix 1 a copy of our client briefing on student harassment as an illustration of a disciplinary area which can have a major impact on a student’s learning experience. However, many of the precepts and the guidance in the Code hold good as general, although not comprehensive, guidance for disciplinary matters. We attach at Appendix 2 our general guidance document on decision making in student matters for higher education clients which was devised with disciplinary processes in mind.
1.4 Since the publication of the Code in 2000 we have seen a number of important developments which have a bearing on the legal position for student complaints and appeals, including:
1.4.1 the abolition of the Visitorial jurisdiction for student matters;
1.4.2 the establishment of the Office of the Independent Adjudicator for Higher Education;
1.4.3 a focus on admissions and widening participation;
1.4.4 the bringing into domestic law of the European Convention on Human Rights;
1.4.5 greater legal rights to disclosure of information;
1.4.6 developing rights under private law - negligence and contract;
1.4.7 new statutory rights prohibiting unlawful discrimination and encouraging diversity;
1.4.8 managing student complaints and appeals in a global context;
1.4.9 this year’s ongoing industrial action.
2 Higher Education Act 2004 (“HEA 2004”)
2.1 The Code includes an appendix which comments on the Dearing Report recommendation that there should be “an independent external element” to the procedures for the handling of student complaints. It also comments on legal difficulties with the then proposals of a system of binding review by an external person and also how any such system would square with the ancient jurisdiction under charity law of the Visitor as the guardian of the domestic laws of the foundation in chartered universities.
2.2 A legislative solution followed. Section 20 of the Higher Education Act 2004 expressly excluded the exclusive Visitorial jurisdiction in respect of all student “disputes” (including complaints, appeals, disciplinary matters). Thus, chartered bodies now face the possibility of being sued in the civil courts by students which had hitherto not been possible for matters falling within the “domestic law” of the institution (as opposed to claims falling within the law of the land).
2.3 It is worth noting that the Visitorial jurisdiction survived being found to be in breach of the European Convention on Human Rights as some had suggested it was. In one of the final legal challenges, the Administrative Court rejected the argument that the Visitor’s involvement of a legal commissary was in breach of the principle of non-delegation.[1] We are aware of the odd case still proceeding before a Visitor, the petition being lodged before the statutory abolition took effect for new disputes.
2.4 Sections 11 to 21 of the HEA 2004 also established the student complaints scheme. The Office of the Independent Adjudicator for Higher Education was appointed as the “designated operator” of that statutory scheme from 1 January 2005.
3 Office of the Independent Adjudicator for Higher Education (“the OIA”)
3.1 It is unnecessary to describe in this update the full details of the OIA’s procedures and jurisdiction (see www.oiahe.org.uk) but a general overview will help ensure that there is an understanding of how this body fits within the overall legal structure for dealing with student complaints and appeals.
3.2 The student complaints scheme is compulsory for “qualifying institutions”[2] and covers registered students and former students of such institutions.
3.3 The scheme covers all student disputes about “acts or omissions” of a qualifying institution, but not admission, decisions or questions of academic judgment.
3.4 The scheme and the jurisdiction of the OIA do not replace or exclude the jurisdiction of the courts for judicial review, discrimination, breach of contract or other legal causes of action. Students may pursue their cases with the OIA or with the court. The OIA will not consider a case while legal proceedings are ongoing. In acting for higher education institutions, we have managed to secure a stay of the legal proceedings in agreement with a student to allow the OIA procedures to be followed first, although the Administrative Court has also dismissed an application we have made to require a stay of judicial review proceedings on the basis of the existence of the OIA’s jurisdiction. Thus, the OIA’s jurisdiction is optional for students.
3.5 Students may only proceed to the OIA upon the “completion of procedures” of the institution and a formal letter needs to be sent by the institution to the student to confirm that that stage has been reached.
3.6 The scheme is free to students; institutions pay an annual subscription.
3.7 The OIA can not make legally binding decisions. Its decisions and recommendations are for the governing body of the institution to consider and adopt, or not. It has no legal sanctions against institutions, although we would expect an institution to have good and cogent reasons for not following an OIA decision as the OIA may name an institution if its decision is not followed. A student may also use the OIA decision as a spring board for a subsequent legal claim in the courts and the OIA decision may be persuasive for a county court judge.
3.8 In most cases, the OIA makes its decisions without an oral hearing.
3.9 The OIA publishes anonymised case studies as an aid to enhancing best practice. It is note worthy that the OIA does recommend the payment of compensation in certain cases, including compensation for loss of earnings. This is a new development, not seen before in judicial precedents in the higher education sector.
3.10 There are some areas of discussion in the sector around the outworking of the OIA’s jurisdiction. We are aware of concerns by some higher education institutions where the OIA requires disclosure of documents or statements to be provided by the institution (which would seem to run counter to the original objective of providing an “independent review” of the procedures followed by the institution).
3.11 The OIA may refer a case to mediation (which is a facilitated negotiation by a trained mediator, the aim being for the parties to reach their own legally binding settlement. In our experience, mediation can work well in appropriate cases and can provide a forum for the airing of grievances and the possibility for more creative solutions to legal disputes. Mediation may not be appropriate in certain cases which are more concerned with ensuring consistency of treatment on academic matters.
3.12 The OIA’s annual report 2005 is now available and it sets out its views on its jurisdiction.
4 Admissions
4.1 As noted above, admissions cases are outwith the OIA’s jurisdiction. They are also now expressly outwith the Visitorial jurisdiction: section 20 of the Higher Education Act 2004. There is no statutory or other forum for an independent review of admissions decisions; such cases may have to be pursued in the courts, although they are unlikely to be successful if the institution can show that the decision was made on academic grounds.[3]
4.2 There has been a greater focus on admissions processes in recent years and Professor Schwartz, the then Vice Chancellor of Brunel University, chaired a group established by Charles Clarke, the then Secretary of State for Education & Skills, into admissions procedures: Fair Admission to Higher Education: recommendations for good practice, September 2004 (“the Schwartz report”).
4.3 The Schwartz report includes a section (B26) and an appendix (Appendix 5) on legal issues and it touches on the complex issue of how the widening participation agenda is reconciled with principles of equality law. It suggests (rightly in our view, although based on legal decisions outside the domestic higher education context) that “improving access to HE for disadvantaged or under-represented groups is a legitimate aim for institutions.”
4.4 In the United States, students who had not been admitted to the University of Michigan due to its affirmative action admissions policies were successful in a legal challenge. While the US Supreme Court upheld the principle of diversity on campus as a legitimate goal for a university, it was also held that its actual points system was unconstitutional.[4]
5 Human Rights Act 1998 (“HRA 98”)
5.1 The HRA 98 incorporated into domestic law the European Convention on Human Rights (“the Convention”) which has meant that from October 2000 individuals have been able to argue in the domestic courts, rather than having to go to the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg, that public authorities have breached their Convention rights.
5.2 There was a flurry of speculative claims in the early days after the coming into force of the HRA 98 and warnings were given by the judiciary about the bringing of hopeless claims based upon the Convention. There has been little case law directly relevant to the higher education sector based on the Convention and the position of student complaints and appeals. However, the HRA 98 has worked a “quiet revolution” in focusing lawyers, judges and others involved in the legal system on individual rights and it has in some senses provided a banner for other rights-based legislation (data protection, equality). Older case law now needs to be re-examined in the light of Convention jurisprudence. The flexible common law notions of natural justice/procedural fairness have no doubt been enriched by Convention thinking.
5.3 It is beyond the scope of this paper to provide a comprehensive survey of Convention cases but we highlight the key rights which may be of significance in the complaints/appeals context:
5.3.1 Article 2 of Protocol 1 – the right not to be denied an education
5.3.2 Article 6 – the right to a fair trial
5.3.3 Article 8 – the right to privacy
5.4 There has been (and still is to an extent) a debate about whether higher education institutions fall within the HRA 98 and, if so, for what functions. The HRA 98 does not list out what bodies are caught (unlike the Freedom of Information Act 2000 for example) but rather it requires a functional analysis of whether the function is public in nature. It is generally accepted that the employment of staff is not a public function, but in our view the award of a degree is more like a public function and we generally advise higher education clients to work on that assumption also. Case law would tend to support that also, for example:
5.4.1 Douglas –v– North Tyneside MBC and the Secretary of State for Education & Skills[5]: here the Court of Appeal held that in principle there was no reason why higher education should be outwith the Convention right of not denying someone an education, but that the application of an age limit for local authority funding did not breach that right;
5.4.2 Yanasik v Turkey and Sulak v Turkey: two cases in which sanctions for academic misconduct were challenged (although we note that different methods of the state securing higher education may be material in some situations). Richard McManus QC in one of the few specialist texts has cited these cases in support of his conclusion: “The state’s right to regulate education also means the right to take disciplinary measures, including suspension and expulsion from an educational establishment.”[6]
5.5 Article 6 was assumed by some to usher in a new regime for all procedures adapted by public authorities, including the requirement for a “fair and public hearing”. However, the context of the Article 6 safeguards is that they exist “where there is the determination of civil rights” and in our view Article 6 is primarily focused on ensuring that the civil courts are compatible with the Convention. There are arguments about whether the Visitorial jurisdiction (which ousted the jurisdiction of the courts) and judicial review in the Administrative Court (which is a supervisory review of a public body’s decision, not a fresh determination of the facts and merits) are fully Article 6 compliant, but we suggest that, notwithstanding the complex arguments, Article 6 did not usher in a new requirement, for example, for public authorities to have an oral hearing in all circumstances. Rather, we prefer the view that in certain situations it may be appropriate and necessary to afford an opportunity for the individual affected by a decision to be able to make representations in person, for example in a disciplinary matter where credibility of testimony is important and the potential sanctions severe, or where the facts are disputed and where oral representations may be necessary to determine what happened (this was argued in a harassment case we defended last year where it was a case of “he said; she said”).
5.6 Under the common law just before the coming into force of the HRA 98, the Administrative Court held, in a case in which we acted, that a University Visitor did not have to hold an oral hearing in a dispute over the marks provided to a trainee teacher.[7] The Administrative Court has also held that it was permissible for a Visitor to engage a legal commissary to advise him and to hear the student’s representations.[8] The European Court of Human Rights also determined in a preliminary paper application that a challenge by a student to UEA’s academic appeals procedures and a Visitorial determination was not admissible under Article 6 as the proceedings did not involve “the determination of a civil right”.[9]
5.7 In a case last year against the University of Plymouth it was argued that the student’s expulsion under the Peninsula Medical School’s Fitness to Practice procedures was disproportionate. Leading counsel for the University accepted that the student’s rights under Article 8 had been engaged (he had been given a hearing before the relevant committee so Article 6 was not called upon to test this point); the decision did impact on his private life and ability to pursue a medical career. The question was whether the interference with that right fell within the limitations to Article 8, it being a “qualified”, rather than an “absolute”, right. The Administrative Court found that the expulsion decision was a proportionate response to the student’s conduct and justifiable in the light of the legitimate aim of protecting health and the rights of others.
6 Academic Judgment
6.1 It is a well established principle that the courts will not interfere with the academic judgments of university examiners:
“…disputes suitable for adjudication under a (university’s) procedures may be unsuitable for adjudication in the courts. This is because there are issues of academic or pastoral judgment which the university is equipped to consider in breadth and in depth, but on which any judgment of the courts will be jejune and inappropriate. This is not a consideration peculiar to academic matters: religious or aesthetic questions, for example, may also fall into this class. It is a class which undoubtedly includes, in my view, such questions as what mark or class a student ought to be awarded or whether an aegrotat is justified.”
Lord Justice Sedley in Clark -v- University of Lincolnshire and Humberside [10]
6.2 That judicial deference to academic judgment has been extended to fitness to practice cases:
“I would add to Sedley LJ’s list of questions on which the judgment of the Court is likely to be inappropriate the question of whether a student is fit to continue his medical studies, and whether, if allowed to proceed, he will ultimately be fit to practise as a doctor. The degree of respect and deference appropriate to such a decision is increased by the consideration that the original decision maker, here the (Professional Behaviour) Committee, had the advantage of seeing and hearing witnesses and, perhaps most importantly, Mr Higham himself, and were able to form a view of him and his personality that a consideration of the documents by this Court cannot approach.”
Stanley Burton J in Higham v University of Portsmouth [11]
6.3 However, the courts are prepared to consider whether the challenge is really to the academic judgment itself or the process leading to the judgment. In a judicial review challenge against the University of Cambridge, in which we acted, the Court of Appeal determined that on the special facts of the case, the University had not afforded procedures which met the requirements of the duty of fairness in requiring a PhD student to de-register for not making sufficient academic progress, for example by not revealing the identity of the independent academic who was asked to review her work and by not disclosing to her the reports on her work by her supervisors and the independent academic.[12]
7.1 We have highlighted some of the main relevant developments in public law already in this paper but it may be helpful to note the key grounds upon which a judicial review challenge may be brought:
7.1.1 ultra vires – the decision making body acted outside its powers;
7.1.2 natural justice – or the broader concept of procedural fairness;
7.1.3 perversity – or “Wednesbury unreasonableness” ie a decision which no reasonable decision maker could have made (this is a higher test than was the decision itself fair and reasonable; the Administrative Court does not gainsay the merits of the decision, but rather exercises a supervisory jurisdiction);
7.1.4 proportionality – which was an emerging principle before the coming into force of the HRA 98 but has been bolstered by European Convention jurisprudence which looks to see whether a decision is a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate goal.
7.2 Each of these grounds for bringing a judicial review challenge in the Administrative Court has a number of facets which would go beyond the scope of this paper, for example whether oral hearings are required, whether the right to legal representation is required, or the right to allow cross examination. Suffice it to say that the duty of fairness will be flexible according to the circumstances and nature of the case and that there is usually no absolute legal requirement for a certain procedural safeguard in all cases. It might also be worth adding that there is no general public law duty to give reasons for decisions (contrary to a suggestion which we have seen made by the OIA in one case), but that it is good administrative practice to do so and will help safeguard an institution against a legal challenge on other grounds (eg that it discriminated unlawfully or took into account irrelevant circumstances in reaching its decision).
7.3 One aspect of the duty to act fairly may be to allow an individual complainant/appellant to be accompanied by a “supporter” in appropriate situations. Please see Appendix 4 for a paper on the question of legal representation at internal student hearings.
8 Private law
8.1 There was some debate about which courts should hear certain types of case, depending on whether the issue raised one of public or private law (see below). However, in Clark – v- the University of Lincolnshire and Humberside[13] the Court of Appeal confirmed that it did not matter whether a student’s case was brought in contract (private law) or by way of judicial review (public law), and that courts should be vigilant to any abuse of process by bringing claims beyond the strict three month limitation period for judicial review cases.
9 Negligence
9.1 There continues to be some debate about whether there is a branch of law developing for “educational malpractice” – or in legal terms, for breach of a duty of care/negligence. Some would argue that there should be a legal liability for negligent marking, or other failings.
9.2 However, there is no authoritative legal precedent for this in the higher education sector in respect of academic matters (as opposed to negligence for example in the care taken for guarding against personal injury on campus[14]). There is some precedent for other types of negligence claims in other areas of education, for example where a local education authority was held vicariously liable for the failure of its educational psychologist to identify and address a school pupil’s learning disabilities.[15]
9.3 It should also be stated that the “categories of negligence are never closed”.
10 Contract law
10.1 One of the reasons why a claim in negligence may not find favour with the courts for failures in academic services provided is that a court may more readily be willing to find that a contract exists between the higher education institution and the fee paying student.[16]
10.2 There are some legal arguments about the nature of the student / university contract in respect of chartered bodies but we do not propose to articulate those here but to work on the assumption for present purposes that a court is likely to find that such a contract exists. We attach at Appendix 3 a copy of our client briefing: “A restatement of the student – university contract (February 2006)” for further notes and information.
10.3 However, although a contract may exist, it will be important to consider in any case: the terms of that contract; whether there has been a breach; whether alternative performance is within the institution’s legitimate discretion; whether any breach has caused a loss; and the extent of such loss. It is trite, but important, that every case is fact sensitive.
10.4 These legal issues have not been tested out sufficiently for any definitive statement to be made about how a court will enforce the student / university contract. In our own experience, we have assisted a university, for example which was sued by a student for the failure of a lecturer to provide a number of lectures. The district judge took the view that it was not the case of working out a fee for each lecture as there was a package of academic services.
10.5 One county court decision has received a lot of attention, though: Buckingham and others v Rycotewood College. In 2003 a group of students at this further education college were awarded compensatory damages for the institution’s breach of contract. The judge found that the students’ course, an HND in historic vehicle conservation, had failed to meet the claims made in the prospectus and during interview. In particular it was found that necessary work experience and tools had not been provided and none of the teaching staff had any practical experience as restorers of old cars. Additionally, and in our view, critically, the students had missed the first term of the course because the college had not obtained approval from BTEC, the awarding body for the course.
10.6 The judge awarded the students £10 000 each, being £7 500 for “loss of value of the course” and £2 500 for “mental distress”, placing education contracts amongst the category of contract for which loss of enjoyment damages may be recoverable (most notably holiday contracts).
10.7 It is noteworthy that the judge did not award damages for loss of earnings. It is also important to note that the decision is not a legal precedent. A county court decision is not binding on any other court and this case needs to be considered on its own facts. The decision was not appealed, either in respect of liability (was there a breach of contract?) or quantum (how much recoverable loss and damage was caused?). Nevertheless, the case may be indicative of an approach which might be taken by a county court judge when faced with a claim by a student for breach of contract.
11 Discrimination and equality
11.1 Equality legislation extends to students as well as staff. For example, it is unlawful for a higher education institution to discriminate on the grounds of religion or belief:
- In the terms of the offer to admit a person to an establishment;
- By refusing or deliberately not accepting an application for his admission to the establishment; and
- Where a person is a student
- In the way it affords him or her access to any benefits;
- By refusing or deliberately not affording them access to them; or
- By excluding them from the establishment or subjecting him to any other detriment.
(Employment Equality (Religion or Belief) Regulations 2003)
There are also legislative provisions relating to:
- Race discrimination – Race Relations Act 1976
- Sex discrimination – see Discrimination Act 1975
- Sexual orientation – Employment Equality (Sexual Orientation) Regulations 2003
- Age discrimination – Employment Equality (Age) Regulations 2005
- Gender reassignment – Gender Recognition Act 2004
- Civil partnerships – Civil Partnership Act 2004
- Disability Discrimination – Disability Discrimination Act 1985 (as amended by Acts in 2001 and 2005).
11.2 Disability discrimination legislation contain provisions not only about giving ‘less favourable’ treatment, but also a failure to make reasonable adjustments for an individual’s disability.
11.3 Higher education institutions (which are funded by HEFCE) also have positive duties to promote equality of opportunity and eradicate discrimination in the areas of race, sex and disability.
11.4 There is considerable guidance available from the various equality commissions in this area and it is beyond the scope of this paper to set out a comprehensive account of equality law.
11.5 Individuals may bring claims for damages (including for injury to feelings) in the county court for unlawful discrimination. Such cases are complex and extremely fact sensitive, and claims have involved academic matters in our experience.
11.6 It is also possible for the relevant equality commission to bring enforcement action for a breach of the various statutory duties. It is noteworthy also that the Equality Act 2006 includes provisions to establish a single Equality and Human Rights Commission.
11.7 The European Convention on Human Rights also includes a protection against discrimination on various grounds in the enjoyment of the other Convention rights and freedoms, including in respect of “any other status”.
11.8 It is also a breach of European Union law to discriminate against individuals (including students) from other member states. Article 12 of the EU Treaty.[17]
12 Disclosure
12.1 The Code rightly notes that institutions should co-operate in providing students with access to information and documentation relating to their complaint or appeal, while respecting the confidentiality and privacy of others. That balancing act holds good: for example, we had to seek an order from the Administrative Court in a case last year to protect the rights of third parties when giving disclosure of an investigation report into allegations of harassment. However, as a general principle of public law, it is unfair to allow the decision maker to have documents which are not provided or made available to the individual affected by the decision. In the context of formal litigation, the Civil Procedure Rules also require early disclosure of relevant documentation and of increasing importance, electronic information.
12.2 Data Protection Act 1998: this legislation has given individuals a statutory right to have access to personal data held about them electronically and in what are called “relevant filing systems”. It is our experience that students often use this statutory right to gain access to information held in their student records in the context of a complaint or appeal, or as a precursor to a legal claim. It is a cheap and powerful right.
12.3 Freedom of Information Act 2000: this legislation extends the subject access right afforded to individuals to gain access to personal data held about them by “public authorities” (which includes higher education institutions receiving HEFCE funding) in “unstructured files”. It also gives a right of access to other information. In this context, De Montford University recently received a determination by the Office of the Information Commissioner (OIC) that certain internal and sensitive information should be disclosed about its pharmacy course, notwithstanding that the University sought to argue that it was covered by exemptions. The OIC considered that the public interest test meant that disclosure was required, notwithstanding the potential damage to reputation. The OIC considered that it was in the public interest for the public to know about standards for the professional training of pharmacologists, and that they are being maintained.
13 Inter relationship between complaints and appeals
13.1 It may be helpful for the Code to say something about the inter relationship between complaints and appeals. In one judicial review decision, the court confirmed that matters which are properly the subject of a student grievance could impact on a review of an academic decision by the board of examiners.[18] On the facts of that case, the court went on to conclude that once the grievance had been rejected, then it could not have impacted on the examination result.
14 Inter relationship between student complaints and staff procedures
14.1 The Code considers the issue of student complaints and appeals without reference to staff procedures. It is our experience that a complaint about an academic matter (eg supervision) may give rise to staff issues (possibly engaging disciplinary procedures if the facts warrant it). It may be helpful for the revised Code to flag the importance of having procedures which join up and for institutions to balance the rights for staff and students.
15 International
15.1 It may be appropriate to consider whether the Code should make specific reference to the globalisation of higher education and the variety of ways in which institutions collaborate internationally. We had experience last year of one institution having a joint venture agreement with overseas institutions in which thought had been given to how certain student issues would be addressed and under whose law, but that these inter-institution agreements had not been communicated adequately to the students, leaving uncertainties about the procedures to be adopted.
16 AUT/NATFHE industrial action 2006
16.1 As an important postscript, it is appropriate to note the current industrial action being pursued by the AUT and NATFHE and the very real concern that the consequences of the industrial action may lead to complaints and / or appeals by students, possibly with claims seeking some form of remedy in external proceedings (for example to the OIA or the courts).
16.2 It is hoped that the situation will soon be resolved for all concerned – staff, students, institutions and the broader group of stakeholders in the higher education sector.
25 May 2006
Gary Attle
Mills & Reeve Partner – Education & Public Law
[1] R –v- The Visitor to Cranfield University ex parte Varma [2004] EWC 1705 (back to text)
[2] Qualifying institutions are defined as: s.11 HEA 2004 any of the following institutions in England or Wales: (a) a university (whether or not receiving financial support under section 65 of the 1992 Act) whose entitlement to grant awards is conferred or confirmed by: 1. an Act of Parliament 2. a Royal Charter 3. an order under s. 76 of the 1992 Act; (b) a constituent college, school or hall or other institution or university falling within paragraph (a); (c) an institution conducted by a higher education corporation; (d) a designated institution as defined by s. 72(3) of the 1992 Act. (back to text)
[3] R-v-University College London ex parte Idriss [1999] EdCR 462 (back to text)
[4] Gutter v Bollinger et al (University of Michigan) 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (back to text)
[5] [2004] 1 All ER 709 (back to text)
[6] Yanasik v Turkey (1993) 74 DR 14, Sulak v Turkey (1996) 84-A DR 98 – McManus J, Education and the Courts, (2nd Ed.) Bristol, 2004 (back to text)
[7] R -v- The Visitor to Brunel University ex parte Jemchi [2001] EWCA 1208 (back to text)
[8] R -v- The Visitor to Cranfield University ex parte Varma [2004] EWHC 1705 (back to text)
[9] Hanaman -v- UK [2000] ELR 685 (back to text)
[10] [2000] 1 WLR 1988 at 1992 E-F (back to text)
[11] [2005] EWHC 1492 at 29 (back to text)
[12] R-v-University of Cambridge ex parte Persuad [2001] EWCA Civ 534 (back to text)
[13] [2000] ELR 345 (back to text)
[14] In 2004 the Court of Session in Scotland dismissed a student’s claim for damages against St Andrew’s University for the injury she suffered by a group of Russian sailors when on an overseas trip with her university. The Court of Session declined to place a legal liability on the University for the criminal acts of others. However, it was left open as to whether there might be a legal liability if the acts took place on premises controlled by the University authorities. (back to text)
[15] Phelps v Hillingdon LBC (2000) LGR 651 (back to text)
[16] Moran v University College Salford [1994] ELR 187; Clark v University of Lincolnshire and Humberside [2000] ELR 345 (back to text)
[17] R (on the application of Bidar) v Ealing LBC (C209/03) (ECJ) European Court of Justice 15 March 2005. (back to text)
[18] R v Leeds Metropolitan University ex parte Manders [1998] ELR 502 (back to text)
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